Tag: Protests

  • Sri Lanka’s new president quickly issues sweeping crackdown on protests

    Sri Lanka’s new president quickly issues sweeping crackdown on protests

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    Ranil Wickremesinghe is the interim president of Sri Lanka per a parliamentary vote, after an unprecedented popular protest brought down former president Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s administration. But while naming an interim president may help the country manage some of its staggering debt, it’s unlikely to bring about the kinds of change protesters demand.

    Gotabaya appointed Wickremesinghe prime minister in May after his brother Mahinda Rajapaksa resigned from the post during the protests. Now, Wickremesinghe — who served as prime minister five previous times and was also finance minister during his most recent term — will serve as president until the country holds a popular vote in 2024.

    Wickremesinghe’s closeness with the Rajapaksa clan — Gotabaya and Mahinda, who was president from 2005 to 2015; their brother Basil, the former finance minister; their brother Chamal, who has held multiple posts; and Mahinda’s son Namal, who served as sports minister under Gotabaya — has made him unpopular with protesters.

    That’s with good reason; on Friday, just two days after Wickremesinghe secured the presidency, police and security forces conducted a violent pre-dawn raid on the main protest encampment in Galle Face, as Amnesty International reported.

    According to the report, the police, special forces, and military staged “a massive joint operation” on the GotaGoGama camp at the Presidential Secretariat — the office of the President of Sri Lanka. Protesters have been staying in tents there since April and were due to vacate parts of the encampment Friday; however, around 1 am local time, security forces descended on the camp with no warning, after having blocked off the encampment’s egresses.

    “There were about 200-300 demonstrators at that time, I would say,” one eyewitness told Amnesty. “Suddenly [the forces] came out from [behind] the barricades and totally destroyed and broke down the tents. There were enough police and military to swamp the area. The police and especially the army beat up peaceful protesters.”

    Amnesty reported at least 50 injured and nine arrested, although activist and attorney Swasthika Arulingam, who’s been involved in the protests in Colombo since March, told Vox that only eight were arrested, all of whom had been bailed out as of noon Eastern time Saturday.

    “We need to reorganize the struggle,” Arulingam told Vox. “People are shaken.”

    Though protesters achieved the unthinkable — getting the Rajapaksas out of leadership despite nearly two decades in power — concerns remain about Wickremesinghe’s ties to the previous administration.

    Financial stability requires political stability

    Wickremesinghe is a longtime political actor who’s held many positions in Sri Lanka’s government. Although he is the head of the United National Party (UNP), the Rajapaksas’ Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) backed him in the parliamentary election to secure his position as the interim president of Sri Lanka.

    Wickremesinghe’s main priority as president is — or should be — helping the country refinance its massive, unsustainable debt and secure loans from the International Monetary Fund, as well as implementing crucial economic reforms to ensure that the economy remains stable in the decades to come. “These are reforms Sri Lanka has been talking about for decades, has been unable to execute, but will have to be now implemented,” Constantino Xavier, a fellow with the Foreign Policy and Security at the Centre for Social and Economic Progress in New Delhi and a nonresident fellow with the India Project at the Brookings Institution told the Brookings Institution’s podcast The Current on Friday. “Reforms in terms of the labor sector, in terms of the public sector companies that still have monopolies in various sectors, from the energy [to] the port sector in Sri Lanka.”

    Wickremesinghe, Xavier said, is “the only individual that has emerged as satisfying different actors” including the IMF and Sri Lanka’s Western creditors who are critical to helping Sri Lanka refinance its debt. “Ranil Wickremesinghe is generally seen as a technocrat that is quite popular in particular with the Western countries that play an influential role here,” Xavier said, although he acknowledged that Wickremesinghe is deeply unpopular with protesters.

    Despite his unpopularity, though, Sri Lanka needs a measure of political stability to continue negotiations with the IMF, the previous session of which concluded in late June, while Gotabaya was still in charge. “I think getting a president in place means you restart the process right away; I think that will be top of the list,” Tamanna Salikuddin, director of South Asia programs at the US Institute of Peace, told Vox in an interview last week.

    On Monday, before he was elected interim president and just after he declared a state of emergency, Wickremesinghe announced that IMF talks were near their conclusion and that “discussions for assistance with foreign countries were also progressing,” Reuters reported last week, quoting a press release from Wickremesinghe’s office.

    The protest movement started over disastrous financial policy under the Rajapaksas, built on the back of their rapacious consolidation of power and dismantling of democratic institutions, as Xavier explained on Friday’s podcast. “They have centralized power politically that has come with some benefits: obviously, that the country has been led with a strong, for some people, authoritarian streak and very decisive governance, but at the same time also the weakening of critical institutions like the Central Bank of Sri Lanka,” he told The Current host Adrianna Pitta. “So therefore when you are progressively over 10, 20 years weakening those governance structures, and the Central Bank of Sri Lanka I mentioned […] because it is really the heart of the financial crisis of the country that has taken on loans without much scrutiny on the sustainability of refinancing mechanisms.”

    Though tackling the approximately $51 billion in debt that Sri Lanka owes is the first priority for its government, looking forward it’s not clear how Sri Lanka can build a sustainable economy when its tourism industry is decimated due to Covid-19, and its agriculture sector due to failed policies.

    “There’s been one body blow after another,” Salikuddin said, referring not only to Covid-19 but also to a 2019 series of bombings at churches celebrating Easter and Russia’s war on Ukraine. “Now, with the collapse, you have countries all over the world issuing safety travel notices, so I don’t see tourism coming back any time, at the same rates that they’re hoping for.”

    Will the Rajapaksas face justice?

    Despite the turmoil Sri Lankans have endured under Gotabaya and his family — chiefly the lack of medicine, basic food supplies, and fuel as well as a disastrous ban on importing chemical fertilizers, which decimated Sri Lanka’s agricultural sector — the Rajapaksas and their cronies might never be held to account.

    They have thus far evaded culpability for alleged human rights abuses during the end of the 30-year civil war between ethnic Tamil militants fighting for a homeland in the north of Sri Lanka and the country’s Sinhalese majority. Mahinda was president in 2009 when the war ended, and Gotabaya was his defense minister; during his time in that role, in the final months of the war, according to a UN panel report, the Sri Lankan military was alleged to have committed atrocities including sexual violence, forced disappearances, and killing of Tamil civilians, claims that the Sri Lankan government denied at the time.

    “I think it’s really interesting to think how the Rajapaksas came to power,” Salikuddin told Vox. “They crushed — with a lot of allegations of human rights violations and war crimes — crushed the Tamils, and that led them to power on this Sinhalese nationalism, Buddhist nationalism wave. So they could tell the majority Buddhist nationalists, ‘Look, we ended this 30-year civil war. We won.’ And the Sinhalese, Buddhist nationalists were okay looking the other way.”

    However, for Tamil and other sidelined minorities, “I think the wounds are still existent,” Salikuddin told Vox. “There’s never been any truth and reconciliation, there’s never been any [addressing] of all the missing persons, or of the war crimes of the Rajapaksas.”

    As of now, Gotabaya is in Singapore, but only on a temporary basis. Thus far, he hasn’t asked for or been granted asylum, the Straits Times reports, so it’s unclear how long he plans to stay.

    Mahinda and his son Namal, the former sports minister who Bloomberg reports is being groomed for a future in political leadership, will not leave Sri Lanka, an unnamed aide told Al Jazeera last week. Meanwhile, Basil, the former finance minister and the brother of Mahinda and Gotabaya, was reportedly turned back at the airport by officials, according to Bloomberg.

    In the immediate term, though the protests have been significant and sustained, and have brought about some victories, “much of what we’ve seen in terms of the protests in Colombo and international media is actually a very urban progressive elite that is on the streets, that is asking for a fundamental reset of the country,” Xavier said, adding that “the majority of the Sri Lankan electorate, I would risk, is still behind the Rajapaksas. This is the conservative, rural, southern vote of the majority ethnic group called the Sinhala group. So therefore, no solution in Sri Lanka can happen without that popular support, particularly when the very painful reforms period will begin in a few months.”

    Furthermore, the fact that crackdowns have already begun two days into Wickremesinghe’s tenure, despite the fact that the protests have been largely peaceful, doesn’t bode well for the future. When asked if she thought the Rajapaksa dynasty would face justice for the downfall of the Sri Lankan economy, Arulingam said, “Not anytime soon.”

    Correction, 8:20 pm: A previous version of this article misstated Ranil Wickremesinghe’s political affiliation. He is the head of the United National Party.

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  • Wickremesinghe sworn in as Sri Lankan president amid protests | Politics News

    Wickremesinghe sworn in as Sri Lankan president amid protests | Politics News

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    Six-time prime minister and veteran politician an unpopular choice among protesters who forced his predecessor out.

    Ranil Wickremesinghe has been sworn in as Sri Lanka’s eighth president by the country’s chief justice.

    The 73 year old, who has been prime minister six times, took the oath of office on Thursday morning, the president’s media office said.

    Wickremesinghe won 134 votes in the 225 member parliament in a secret vote on Wednesday, after Gotabaya Rajapaksa fled the country amid months of protests and a deepening economic crisis.

    Protesters have also objected to Wickremesinghe becoming president, saying he is too close to the discredited Rajapaksa family.

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  • Sri Lanka’s protests are just the beginning of global instability

    Sri Lanka’s protests are just the beginning of global instability

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    Sri Lanka’s president finally resigned. Protesters celebrated, and they had reason to: Their mass demonstrations — including a takeover of the presidential mansion — drove President Gotabaya Rajapaksa from office.

    Sri Lanka’s economy is in free fall. The country doesn’t have enough money to buy essentials: food, medicine, and especially fuel. Buses can’t run, schools can’t open. The economic crisis was years in the making because of mismanagement, but terror attacks in 2019, and later the Covid-19 pandemic, which shriveled Sri Lanka’s tourist economy, pushed it to the brink.

    But the domestic political turmoil unfolding in Sri Lanka also links back to the instability across the globe, including the war in Ukraine and all of its consequences.

    It may seem strange to link street protests against the Sri Lankan government to a war in Europe, but food and oil markets are global. A shock in one place ripples everywhere. The Ukraine war compounded supply chain pressure in the wake of Covid-19, and Moscow’s war in Ukraine and Western sanctions against Russia have squeezed agricultural exports — critical supplies like grain and sunflower oil — from the entire Black Sea region. These products can be replaced on the global market, but at a cost. Fuel prices are also up, and if it costs more to buy diesel for a tractor or to transport cargo, food becomes more expensive still. Food becomes all that much harder to afford for poor countries, and for poor people in rich countries.

    The United States and Europe are seeing these price shocks. So are people in Ghana and Mozambique and Mexico and Ecuador and Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. Food, fuel, and other essentials are getting more expensive, everywhere. Many of these governments want to intervene, but their economies were already pummeled by the Covid-19 pandemic, and so they don’t have the funds to respond to these crises.

    That means standards of living will fall in many countries, and that more people will slip into poverty. The United Nation’s World Food Program has warned that the number of food-insecure people has risen to 345 million; nearly 50 million people in more than 45 countries are at risk of falling into famine conditions.

    But the global instability that causes prices to rise also creates more instability. Food prices, for example, are rarely the only reason that a government falls, but they can help crystallize simmering discontent in a country. “If you can point to rising food prices, it is a sign that something is failing in the implicit contract between the government and the governed,” said Cullen Hendrix, a nonresident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and professor at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver.

    Vox spoke to Hendrix about why food costs can coincide with political unrest, and where and when that happens — and why Sri Lanka likely represents just the beginning of the volatility about to envelop the globe.

    This conversation has been edited and condensed for clarity.


    Jen Kirby

    This is a big question, but what is happening, broadly, around rising prices around food and fuel, and political unrest?

    Cullen Hendrix

    We need to decompose that into thinking about food prices and thinking about fuel prices.

    Up until about 2000, the two of those weren’t really correlated. You had periods where you had very high food prices and very low oil prices, or very high oil prices coinciding with low food prices.

    The 2000s are when those two things start to trend much more together. In some ways, the current crisis looks the most like the 2007-2008 food price crisis, because we have simultaneous crises in both food markets and oil markets in terms of elevated prices as a response to, in this case, instability caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In 2007 and 2008, it had more to do with climatic shocks, and then the ways that many producer countries — countries that normally export food — decided to institute export bans.

    So, having kind of decomposed those two things, we probably need to take food and fuel prices separately.

    Jen Kirby

    Okay, so how do they work?

    Cullen Hendrix

    Generally speaking, there is a positive relationship between higher prices for food in international markets and protest activity. This relationship is particularly evident in democratic and semi-democratic countries. Protest dynamics tend to be less responsive to global food prices in more authoritarian countries.

    With respect to oil prices as separate from food prices, the research on this topic is a bit more mixed. It’s certainly the case that higher fuel prices can erode real incomes. They can eat into purchasing power, and they can generate significant grievances with incumbent regimes, who are being asked to do something about these higher prices. But it turns out that these higher oil prices are also a source of revenue that many governments that export oil can capture, and they can use that to reinvest back into price supports and mechanisms of ensuring social stability.

    A good way of thinking about this is to look back at the Arab Spring, and the places where the Arab Spring protests got the most traction, like Tunisia and Egypt, are small oil exporters, if they export oil at all. Whereas countries like Kuwait were able to weather the storm because although they were paying a higher bill for their food imports, they were also reaping these windfall profits associated with higher commodity prices for their main export, being oil. They were able to invest in lavish public spending at a time when, in the wider region, many governments were having to go on austerity diets and slash social spending at precisely the time when doing so was most likely to enrage the populace.

    Jen Kirby

    So people are frustrated with inflation in places like the United States and Europe, but as yet, we haven’t seen a mass wave of protests over, say, gas prices. That may happen, but I’m also wondering if this is more likely to happen in countries with less-developed economies, and where the government may have limited ability or capacity to respond.

    Cullen Hendrix

    We know less about the ability of the government to respond, but your point about average incomes is definitely well taken. If you’re in a developing country, and you’re spending 50 percent of your take-home income on food, and much of that food is unprocessed — you’re actually buying bulk wheat, or maybe wheat flour — the increase in food prices hits you much harder than it does, say, for you and me, where we spend a much smaller proportion of our income on food. It’s not as significant a source of hardship. And a lot more of the money that we spend on food, actually, is money spent on packaging and marketing and the like, as opposed to people who are living maybe half a step removed from the underlying bulk commodity.

    So higher-income countries see less of this kind of protest. We have seen things like the antecedents of what you’re talking about. If you remember back to the yellow vest protests in France and Belgium, those were protests in response to reductions in the subsidies for diesel fuel.

    Jen Kirby

    One of the things I sometimes struggle with in covering protests is that food and fuel prices can factor among them, or be the “spark,” but they ultimately lead to a longer list of grievances against a government. It can be hard to disentangle, and I am wondering, how do you make sense of exactly what role food and fuel prices play in protest movements?

    Cullen Hendrix

    At any sufficiently large protest, people are going to be there for a variety of reasons. Food and fuel prices may be significant for some participants, but they may not be particularly significant for others.

    It’s not typically the most food-insecure people that wind up participating in these protests. It’s not the truly hungry. It’s that if you can point to rising food prices, it is a sign that something is failing in the implicit contract between the government and the governed, in terms of being able to secure people’s ability to have plentiful and appropriate food at a bearable price. If you think about that as being the bedrock of the social contract in these regimes going all the way back to Roman times — that’s where the concept of “bread and circuses” comes in — then, yes, they’re kind of a canary in the coal mine for the broader inability of the government to address the grievances and the needs of the populace.

    Jen Kirby

    And so I think part of the challenge now, and correct me if I’m wrong, but for countries like Sri Lanka, where you have that fundamental breakdown of the contract, because of what’s happening around the globe — specifically, the war in Ukraine — it is much harder for those countries to figure out an adequate response because they have less tools at their disposal?

    Cullen Hendrix

    One hundred percent. The issue in a place like Sri Lanka — and if you look through the list of other places that are experiencing these kinds of inflation protests, like Albania, Argentina, Panama, Kenya, Ghana — these are not places with a ton of what economists would call fiscal space. They do not have the ability to offset these price increases with ramped-up government spending and targeted transfers and subsidies to offset the pain. These are cash-strapped governments; they went into the crisis cash-strapped, many of them because of the ongoing effects of the Covid pandemic.

    Jen Kirby

    You mentioned the food crisis in 2007 and 2008. But what are some historical precedents for when higher global food prices created political instability?

    Cullen Hendrix

    I was getting ready to say — I hate to bang on Russia, but I don’t hate to bang on Russia, as this has been their fault before. If you go back to 2010-2011 and the Arab uprisings, the food price spike occurred because Russia decided unilaterally to impose an export ban on wheat, barley, a bunch of other kinds of grains, in response to heat waves and wildfires that were projected to decimate their harvest. In order to maintain domestic food supplies and lower prices, they decided to not export.

    The problem was that many of the countries that were counting on those exports — the same way as it is now, the countries that are counting on Black Sea exports, both from Russia and Ukraine — were the countries in the Middle East and North Africa, which are deeply food import-dependent. Then, as now, they’re basically thrust back into international markets at much higher prices to try and satisfy their need for food imports.

    There were obviously elements to the Arab uprisings that had nothing to do with food prices, but it is important to understand the contributing factor that food prices can play.

    The Arab Spring protests were largely coordinated and organized by people who had lots of anti-regime sentiment and had been organizing around it. But what brings otherwise apolitical people out into the streets to participate in these mass movements often are these kinds of political issues that are much more picayune, as opposed to the broader dissatisfaction with the regime, or indeed, the regime type.

    Over time, a lot of those protests that were related to food and fuel prices metastasize into protest movements around the form of government, like, “Why don’t we get to elect our government? Why are we run by these corrupt authoritarians?” But there was a significant part of it that began with the food and fuel price spikes.

    Jen Kirby

    Is there something of a tipping point when it comes to food price spikes — like when they reach certain levels, the likelihood of instability increases?

    Cullen Hendrix

    I’m hesitant to say that there is a tipping point where I can say, “Once food gets above X price, then it’s on.” I don’t think there’s sufficient evidence for that.

    I will say that the prices we’re currently seeing are, if not historic, near historic. The last time we saw food prices this high in international markets was in 1974. Back then, global food trade was a much smaller share of actual food consumption. Higher global prices mattered less for people’s ability the world over to feed their families.

    Jen Kirby

    What are the places you’re paying attention to when it comes to political unrest as a result of rising food prices?

    Cullen Hendrix

    I would keep an eye on West Africa, particularly Ghana and Nigeria. I think that there is potential for maybe Pakistan. The non-oil-rich Middle East and North African countries, and maybe Central America. I think that’s a significant issue, because it’s co-occurring with droughts. But it’s also the case that these countries, because of rapid rates of urbanization, are becoming increasingly dependent on global markets, and these are countries with fragile governance systems to begin with.

    Jen Kirby

    Basically sounds like the whole world.

    Cullen Hendrix

    I mean, the outlook isn’t great. These markets are being reined in a little bit. The higher oil prices that are a function of these kinds of political instability tend to be relatively short-lived. They’re persisting longer now, just because of how large an exporter Russia is and the scale of instability. Typically, in the past, other big exporters have increased exports to offset the effects of this kind of destabilization. But I wish I had better news for you.

    Jen Kirby

    What are some possible interventions that the United States or other wealthier governments might be able to do to ameliorate some of these brewing crises in poorer parts of the world?

    Cullen Hendrix

    The G-7 and then the G-20 both attempted to push through agreements not to use export bans. India gets a carve-out because India is, you know, a developing country, and I think it’s more political theater than it is actual constraint on food supply and food exports.

    In terms of longer-term — and this is where we get really speculative — ultimately, we need to reform the global food producing system in ways that increase resilience, not just to climate change, but also to these kinds of geopolitical shocks, because I don’t think this is going anywhere. If you look at the projections of the kinds of countries that are going to be seeing increasing yields and potentially larger harvests moving forward, it is places like Russia, Kazakhstan, the United States, and Canada.

    That said — and this is the thing that I think is potentially more controversial — I’m of the opinion that we probably need to see more subsidization of agriculture in developed countries, as opposed to less. I wish it were the case that we could convince voters in Iowa to subsidize food production in places like Thailand or Kenya; unfortunately, electoral politics don’t work that way. But the subsidies that are paid by taxpayers in developed countries are actually subsidizing consumption at the global level.

    That’s not necessarily a super popular opinion, especially among folks who are fairly wedded to agricultural development in developing countries as a mechanism for growth. But I do think that’s something we need to be getting serious about, because I don’t think, in the near term, we’re going to be able to offset these kinds of volatility that can be created by these countries with very large market shares having their supply just go offline. There’s not enough slack in the global food system to make up for that.

    If I’m understanding you correctly, the global food market basically works the way it works. But having a place like the United States or Canada, which does have the capacity to supply more people, they could make up for some of the pressure when Russia or another major area is taken offline or creates major disruptions?

    Cullen Hendrix

    I tend to believe in markets, but I will say that markets for basic necessities like food, these are not markets you want to operate according to cold economic logic. The market for food is not a market where you want to wind up at the end of the sale with no available supply. We can’t have that because we need to have buffers in the system precisely because of events like the ones we’ve seen. And so if that’s physical grain reserves, [or] if it’s governments willing to use what they call virtual reserves, which are basically governments, in a coordinated fashion, intervening in markets to short these futures contracts to drive prices back down.

    There are things that can be done. It’s just going to take an investment of resources and, I think, broader awareness of the enlightened self-interest that it does not make the United States any safer and more prosperous to exist in the world where many of our trading partners and many of our strategic partners around the world are facing instability because they can’t feed their populations.

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