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Paper submitted for the U.S. Summit for Democracy
Foreword
The U.S. Government organized a Summit for Democracy held 9-10 December 2021. It is understood that the Summit for Democracy is both global and multiyear rather than being a one-off event focused on a single or selected regions of the world. This discussion paper is focused on the African dimensions on democracy and aims to kick start a series of research, public engagement and knowledge production activities to be led by the African Centre for the Study of the United States based at the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa.
Introduction
The overarching framework adopted in this discussion paper is based on perceptions and perspectives on democracy across key themes. Specifically, synthesis of various types of literature shows that views swing between pessimism and optimism with regards to Africa’s past, present and future democratic dynamics, fortunes and trajectories. Depending on the position taken by a government official, politician, scholar, an organization or practitioner in any field, views oscillate between the perspective that Africa is witnessing democratic renewal and consolidation or that the continent is in fact undergoing democratic backsliding.
The ambiguous and ambivalent split between ostensible democratic retreat on the one hand and an upward democratic ascendency is backed by incidences, examples and facts and figures. Consequently, the state of democracy in Africa is a mixed bag. For a discussion paper of this nature – meant to serve as the starting point for thematic case studies – it is deemed necessary to adduce evidence of democratic pessimism on the one hand and democratic optimism on the other hand in broad strokes. This is a top-level analysis with the understanding that subsequently, specific thematic, country, regional and comparative studies and analyses will be commissioned and published.
Those who see democracy in Africa as declining argue that democratic institutions are being hollowed out, incidences of political and social disintegration are on the rise, and societies across the continent are witnessing high levels of instability. From this point of view, it matters little if the factors of democratic pessimism are large scale or if they are small and incipient. The key point of departure is that on the whole, the continent is witnessing consistent democratic backsliding underpinned by the entrenchment of authoritarianism as leaders devise strategies to stay in power, lead through proxy or overstay in power and either die in office or are forced out.
The alternative view is that the promise of democratic consolidation is on the march since the so-called “second liberation” era following the collapse of Soviet-style socialism-communism as an ideology and triumph of liberalism in late 1980s and early 1990s. Certainly, political liberalisation and the onset of the democratic wave that swept through the African continent since the early 1990s has injected demonstrable optimism[i] into the African body politic.
A key element of the optimist’s outlook is to reflect on the timeline between 1990 and 2021. The early 1990s is particularly held up as the formative stage for Africa’s democratization, when Africa’s political landscape was characterised by a wave of political liberalization, which saw the introduction multiparty systems on a scale hitherto unimaginable. In the late 1980s for instance, there were only about four democracies on the continent. By the end of the 1990s, most African countries had moved into a category that may be styled as nominally democratic. A major element in the Africa’s political liberalization was the rise in multiparty elections as integral to governance[ii]. In the early 1990s African countries embraced multiparty systems of democracy through multiparty elections starting with Benin and Zambia in 1991 thereby establishing a culture in which plural politics is today entrenched across the continent[iii].
Most African countries abandoned one-party systems and military rule in favour of democratic constitutions that would guarantee, at least on paper, civil and political rights, civilian control of the military, and legislative and judicial oversight of the executive branches of government.
This optimistic view holds that democracy has gained traction as a system of governance over the past three decades between 1990 and the present. The sentiment is that in many swathes of the continent, it would be impossible for countries to revert to the one-party dictatorships that had previously marked the continent’s governance contours.
The optimists for instance point to a rise in the increased number of peaceful transfers of power from one regime to another for the three decades between 1990 and 2021 compared to the three-decade period between the 1960s to the late 1990 when many leaders served for long stretches of time.
Optimisms aver that the long struggle for democracy catalysed favourable outcomes for the continent in the 1990s, such as the rejection of military rule in countries like Nigeria and Ghana; the collapse of the apartheid regime in South Africa; the removal from power of brutal strongmen such as Samuel Doe in Liberia, Mathieu Kérékou in Benin and Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire; the gains for pluralism and multipartyism in Niger, Madagascar, Cameroon, Zambia, Algeria, Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Zaire, Mozambique, Angola, the Congo, and São Tomé and Príncipe; as well as the increased pressure for democratization in nations such as Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Cameroon, and Zimbabwe[iv].
Challenges to democracy
Dismissing the optimistic view as nothing more than nostalgia about an era gone by, the pessimistic view is forged in the many challenges that democracy faces on the continent.
These include among others: corruption in all its forms and shapes, particularly state-led corruption[v], human rights violations, direct and subtle control of the media leading to poor freedoms of expression and the press[vi], the use of public or state resources for personal and partisan purposes, self-serving constitutional changes particularly those relating to presidential term limits, unconstitutional transfer of power through military coups (see figure 1) and poor inclusion and participation of marginalized groups especially women and the youth in political processes.
Figure 1: Military Coup D’état index in Africa since 2000
Optimists emphasize the so-called Africa rising narrative, which argues that the continent is much more prosperous today than it was in the 1990s and attribute the ostensible economic development to improvements in governance. Pessimists however contest the benefits of democratization, pointing out that the promise of democracy to inspire economic development has not materialized at levels anticipated in the earlier period. Indeed, this critical stance holds that underwhelming economic development at levels far lower than envisaged during the decade of the 1990s is yet another factor constraining the democratic dispensation since democracy is heavily linked to development.
The ambiguous and ambivalent traits emanate from the fact that political regimes in Africa are of a wide variety. Scholars of African democratization have dubbed as “hybrid regime”, the trait of governance structures in which leaders operate by democratic rules and principles while at the same time employing authoritarian governance methods when it suits them. In many African countries, these ambiguous political systems mean that incumbent leaders can claim to be pursuing democracy under unique national and regional circumstances. The notion of hybrid regimes and the unevenness in governance models and approaches have the effect of limiting the prospects of political change on a continental scale. The argument is that governance across the continent ought to move towards uniformity even if not the same governance practices. For instance, Seychelles is seen as one of the more stable democracies on the continent while Somalia is literally a failed state. While countries such as Malawi, Kenya, Zambia, Namibia, Ghana and Senegal have seen frequent leadership changes, this is not the case in many other African countries. Leaders who have manipulated political systems to stay in power for long include Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Obiang Nguema (41 years), Cameroon’s Paul Biya (38 years), Republic of Congo’s Denis Sassou Nguesso (36 years) and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni (35 years).
Multiparty Politics as a Novelty
The pessimistic view is that Africa’s experimentation with multiparty political systems is still relatively new, and that this novelty is observable in political behaviours. The view is that the history and evolution of multiparty politics in Africa is far from mature and entrenched, as seen in frequent subversion of multiparty democratic principles. The argument is that in many African countries, multiparty democracy was forced through domestic agitation and Western intervention but with leaders remaining committed to a one-party attitude. In other words, some of the past and current African leaders took it that multiparty democracy was a Western construct that they had to accept as a means of avoiding sanctions.
There have been several arguments to the effect that multiparty democracy runs counter to indigenous African governance ideologies and philosophies and that the multiparty political system is alien to Africa. Moreover, it has been argued that African electoral systems are beset with limited political experience and cannot rely on significant previous experience with multiparty elections after the transitions of the early 1990s.
Part of the problem is the absence of institutional structures and building blocks that can shape both the process and the outcomes of competitive politics. The critical institutions that would ensure checks and balances on the executive – particularly presidents, prime ministers and other elites – include strong and independent judicial systems, independent electoral management bodies, independent legislatures, and open and free media. These would increase the likelihood of free and fair elections and further translate to sustaining the democratic experiment in Africa. It is for the weaknesses, manipulation and hollowing out of the institutional infrastructures, the argument goes, that countries initially praised as exemplars of multiparty democracy have slipped back to one-party mentalities and cultures.
While optimists may concede that that multiparty democracy has become the preferred choice[vii] as a system of governance in the majority of the 55 countries since the early 1990s, at the same time however, the pace at which democratization has developed has not lived to the promise in many parts of Africa. At the international level for instance, the fact that only a handful of African Union (AU) member states ratified[viii] the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) shows non-commitment by member states towards free, credible, and fair elections[ix]. In this incidence, a continental democratic policy has been subverted by the very nations that devised it. More broadly, elected leaders have devised means of circumventing electoral processes.
Elections
Elections in Africa stand out as the political processes during which democracy is put to intense test, again, with a mixed bag of optimistic and pessimistic views. One might take the optimistic view that multiparty elections across Africa since the 1990s have normatively come to represent standard mechanisms and procedures for citizens to exercise choice concerning the leaders they want. The electoral cycles may be flawed, as we see below, but they still serve as vehicles for competitive politics. Cases of optimism in 2021 can be seen in South Africa, Ghana, Senegal and the island of Cape Verde, which were rated highly by the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance’s (IDEA) governance ratings report[x] for conducting free and fair elections. These may serve as role models for the rest of the continent.
Indeed, today, most leaders in countries that have signed on multiparty electioneering as a leadership and governance approach must employ devious and indirect strategies in their bids to defeat the purposes of elections. Explicit electoral fraud of the kind that was rampant between the 1960s and the late 1980s has substantially receded even though practices in some countries are still stuck in the pre-1990 electoral methods. It is only as it becomes evident that they could lose elections that most leaders employ draconian means and indeed, in some countries, attempts at defeating the purposes of free and fair elections have failed. Even though uneven, the fact that elections are held at all is an instance of cautious optimism for democracy in Africa.
The adherence to basic multiparty elections by autocratic regimes across the continent is thanks to emboldened and resilient opposition parties, civil society and the media as seen in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda[xi]. Optimistic vistas are provided by the Southern Africa countries of Zambia and Malawi, which saw to the peaceful transfer of power in 2021 and 2020 respectively. In the case of Zambia, former president Edgar Lungu conceded defeat allowing for the inauguration of his long-time opponent, Hakainde Hichilema. In Malawi, a presidential re-run in 2020 was delayed because of bottlenecks relating to the Covid-19 pandemic. When the results of the repeat elections were announced, current President Lazarus Chakwere beat Peter Mutharika who had in turn “inherited” the position from his elder brother, the late Bingu wa Mutharika. In both cases, the triumph of erstwhile opposition party leaders over then ruling parties was attributed to the resilience of opposition parties, the participation of youth and vibrant civic society and the willingness – albeit reluctantly – of incumbent leaders to exit the stage. The Zambian and Malawian cases are however not the norm as leaders do not always leave power even when they lose elections as in the dramatic case of The Gambia where former leader, Yahya Jameh, was forced into exile in Equatorial Guinea after refusing to concede electoral defeat in 2016[xii].
On the opposite side of the spectrum however, good governance practises are seen to have declined in many African countries from Morocco to Eswatini. This comes as no surprise when Freedom House[xiii] rankings of political and civil liberties in African countries have declined significantly over recent years. The 2021 Freedom House rankings show that 22 African countries are “not free” while only 8 are categorized as “free” with the rest falling in the “partly free” category. The countries that rank as free thereby serving as points of optimism on the continent are, Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Sao Tome and Principe and Tunisia.
Despite the somewhat optimistic pictures on hand in Zambia and Malawi, critics have however questioned the veracity of elections as a means of change in governance and political transitions particularly with regards to change from one regime to another. As pointed out earlier, multiparty politics was largely meant to ensure smooth transfers of power from one regime to another. Instead, far from uniformly leading to change of leadership, multiparty elections have become instruments for incumbents to hold on to state power. Thus, the irony is that multiparty elections in many parts of Africa have become mere rituals manipulated by incumbents for their continuity in office[xiv].
The illiberal strategies employed during electoral processes by incumbents include, inter alia, intimidating or suppressing the opposition through state or militia-sponsored violence, use of state resources for personal political campaigns and outright rigging of elections by for instance announcing doctored election results. In recent times, analysts have pointed to rigged elections in Kenya, Uganda, Gabon, Kenya, Chad, Tunisia, Zimbabwe, Cameroon and Guinea in some instances stitching up the results so that they look legitimate. Furthermore, researchers have noted that between 2012 and 2016, more than two-thirds of elections in Africa featured significant vote buying. This shows the difficulty of using elections as a measure for consolidating and sustaining democracy.
Elections and politics under the pandemic
Often elites in power latch on circumstances to unleash violence and justify electoral fraud. A case in point is the continuing Covid-19 pandemic. The authorities in several countries, notably Tanzania and Uganda, weaponised the pandemic to quell popular protests and harass opposition politicians and their supporters, journalists and activists. Since the beginning of the pandemic countries on the continent have held more than a dozen general elections, many of them marred by violence amid the pandemic. In Tanzania and Togo, amendments to laws ushered in more wide-ranging restrictions on freedom of association and peaceful assembly. In Guinea, the authorities banned over 20 protests on vague and overly broad grounds. Crackdowns on protests were particularly common before, during and after elections in the countries that went to elections during the pandemic.
In January 2020, Cameroonian authorities violently disrupted peaceful protests. The re-election of President Paul Biya in 2018 and arbitrary arrest of nearly 300 protesters is an example was the trigger of the popular protests. Burundi’s authorities continued to crack down on human rights defenders, activists and civil society organizations. For instance, the government suspended civil society organization PARCEM (Parole et Actions pour le Réveil des Consciences et l’Evolution des Mentalités), and a court upheld the conviction and 32-year prison sentence against human rights defender Germaine Rukuki. In Mauritania, anti-slavery activist Ahmedou Ould Wediaa was arbitrarily arrested during a police raid at his home following his criticism of the authorities’ response to election-related protests.
Constitutional changes and term limits
As discussed above a creeping tendency of elections being used as a strategy for longevity in power by leaders has become a new form of democratic backsliding in Africa. At the beginning of the multiparty era, it was held that term limits – often two terms of four or five years each in office – was sufficient for a president or prime minister. Since the early 2010s however, several African countries have either dispensed with limits to their terms in office or extended their longevity in office often through stage-managed constitutional changes. Between 2015 and 2021, at least thirteen African countries amended or eliminated constitutional provisions on presidential term limits. Term limits have been circumvented to allow leaders to stay in power beyond the initially, legally allowed duration. These include Djibouti under Ismail Omar Guelleh (2011), the Democratic Republic of Congo under former president Joseph Kabila (2015), Burundi under the former and late president Pierre Nkurunziza (2015) and Rwanda under incumbent Paul Kagame in 2017.
In Guinea in 2020, at least 17 people died (including at least 11 people in October and three in November) during demonstrations against a constitutional revision that could allow President Alpha Condé to run for a third term. A similar development was witnessed in neighbouring Cote d’Ivoire where a constitutional change in favour Alassane Ouattara was forced through despite deadly protests. In Uganda President Yoweri Museveni (77 years old) – who removed term limits in 2006 – successfully manoeuvred the passage of legislation that led to the removal of age limits in late 2017 allowing for clinching power for the umpteenth in 2020. This has signalled the return of African strongmen of yore or the “presidents for life” phenomenon which multiparty politics was meant to redress.
In these and other examples, multiparty elections have been used to prolong and legitimise autocrats who present themselves as new democrats thus placing African democracies into a perpetual state of transitional rather than mature democracies. The upshot attendant to extensions of term limits and removal of presidential durations is a rise in authoritarianism as it makes it difficult to put checks and balances on presidential powers in the nations.
Corruption
Another set of factors that imperil democracy relate to, as discussed earlier, the paucity in the development of cultures of good governance and rule of law and the concomitant harassment of opposition political parties, the media and civil society. Attendant to this is the diversification and entrenchment of old and new forms of corruption as well as the politics of ethnicity and cronyism. A 2002 AU study estimated that corruption cost the continent roughly $150 billion a year with further studies indicating that the situation has worsened over the years. The African Union designated 2018 as the year of anti-corruption but this was seen as mere tokenism. Corruption in Africa ranges from high-level political state-graft on the scale of millions of dollars to low-level bribes to police officers or customs officials.
While graft at the highest state levels imposes the largest direct financial cost on a country, petty bribes have a corrosive effect on basic institutions and undermine public trust in the government. Examples of how corruption can tip the scales in such a way seemingly stable countries degenerate into political crises include countries such as Nigeria, Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The economies of most if not all African remain state-centric, thus dominant state executives can utilise state resources and rents, including foreign aid and mineral wealth, to their own advantage. In South Africa, this has come to be framed as state capture.
As the Pandora Papers have recently shown, African leaders remain the wealthiest people on the continent and their wealth is often a function of illegal acquisitions. Indeed, the circulation of political elites often drawing on nepotistic family ties, crass ethnic solidarity and cronyism, in positions of authority, has been identified as a major avenue for the capture of the states for financial malfeasance. Even at lower levels in civil and public service structures and perhaps taking the cue from top elites, corruption and bribery remain endemic, and particularly affects the judiciary, police, and government contracting operations. With regards to the rule of law for instance, corruption is a major source of the paucity in independent courts which are then used or misused by leaders.
In the pursuit of private gain, public officials often consider public resources as their opportunity to escape the spectre of poverty. In the private sector, corruption is associated with the payment of bribes to circumvent laid-down procedures[xv]. Thus, corruption is prevalent in situations in which people in positions of trust have monopoly to execute schemes for private gain. Of the ten countries considered most corrupt in the world, six are in sub-Saharan Africa[xvi] (Somalia, South Sudan, Libya, DRC, Sudan, and Equatorial Guinea).
During the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, there have also been concerns about the management and disbursement of funds donated to support governments’ Covid-19 responses, leading to demands for increased transparency and accountability in Cameroon, Tanzania, Kenya and Nigeria. Concerns about human rights rose as authorities responded to popular protests and critical political commentary with violent repression, including arrests, detention, and torture and in some cases killing of protesters, dissenters and journalists, notably in Nigeria and Zimbabwe.
Military Coups
Earlier in this discussion paper, the trend of declines in military coups and civil wars in the period after the re-introduction of multiparty elections in the 1990s was pointed at as an exemplification of democratic optimism. An analysis of developments in the recent past however shows that military takeovers and civil wars have not entirely disappeared from the African political landscape. In fact, coups are resurgent, and the guns are yet to fall silent on some of Africa’s long-running civil wars. In the recent past, military supported transitions have taken place in Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, Chad, Guinea, Niger and Mali.
In most countries where coups have occurred, the militaries took advantage of long running grievances by the masses especially demands for political change, as was the case in Mali, Sudan, Libya, and Egypt. In the 2017 coup in Zimbabwe military officers allied to the incumbent, President Emmerson Mnangagwa ousted former president, the late Robert Mugabe even though it was characterised as a “smooth regime change”.
In August 2020, a military coup in Mali ousted constitutionally elected president Boubacar Keita. In 2021, a military takeover saw to the arrest and detention of former president Alpha Conde, as well as the removal of Sudanese President Abdalla Hamdok from office.
These are but some of the examples that demonstrate the difficulties of a democratic dispensation on the continent regardless of whether the leaders who were ousted through military interventions deserved the ejection or not. In Mali, security deteriorated significantly, with widespread killings of civilians by armed groups and self-proclaimed ‘self-defence groups’. In response, Malian security forces committed multiple violations including extrajudicial executions and torture like happenings in Sudan and Libya.
Civil Wars
Civil wars are equally far from over on the continent underpinning drawbacks to cohesive leadership and governance. The ongoing conflict in Ethiopia, pitting the federal government against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) is the latest incidence of armed conflict internal to an African nation that has triggered dire humanitarian crises and raised the spectre of a conflagration in the wider Horn of Africa region. The Ethiopian crisis only goes to show violent approaches to governance challenges in Africa’s theatres of civil strife.
Ongoing conflicts in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and South Sudan have destabilized societies not only putting paid to development but also harming civilians in their thousands. Protracted conflicts in the Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan and South Sudan continued to simmer, with indiscriminate and targeted attacks on civilians. Armed groups in Cameroon, Mali, Nigeria, and elsewhere have committed abuses, including killings and abductions, which caused mass displacements. State security forces have often replied in ways that trigger serious human rights violations such as extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances and torture.
These conflicts and insecurity – together with new forms of communal violence that emerged in countries like Ethiopia – are brutal reminders that Africa is a long way from breaking its deadly cycle of instability. Often what have been silenced are not the guns but justice and accountability for crimes and other serious human rights violations. From Nigeria to South Sudan, countless victims of serious crimes and abuses have not seen justice and reparations. In South Sudan, civilians have been continuously killed in sporadic clashes between government forces and rebel groups almost as soon as the country attained independence in 2011. Parties to the conflict have obstructed access to humanitarian aid, increasing numbers of children have been recruited as child soldiers, and abuses relating to sexual violence have been pervasive.
In the Darfur region of Sudan, the Sudanese government forces and allied militias carried out unlawful killings, sexual violence, systematic looting, and forced displacements. The destruction of at least 45 villages in Jebel Marra continued into February 2016, and by May 2016, over 100, 000 people had been forced to flee. In Cameroon’s north-west and south-west regions, Anglophone armed separatist groups continued to commit abuses including killings, mutilations and abductions. The military responded disproportionately, committing extrajudicial executions and burning homes.
In Ethiopia, the response of security forces to a surge in communal violence that killed hundreds often involved excessive use of force. For example, in January 2019 the Ethiopian Defence Forces killed at least 22 people, including children, during operations to contain ethnic violence in the Amhara region. The army promised an investigation, but its findings have not been forthcoming. In Sudan in April 2019, thousands of peaceful protesters ended decades of repression under President Omar al-Bashir and revived hopes for respect for human rights. However, this came at a terrible price, as 177 people were killed and hundreds more injured when security forces used live ammunition, tear gas, beatings and arbitrary arrests to break up mass peaceful protests in Khartoum and elsewhere.
Terrorism and Counterterrorism
Terrorism and counterterrorism similarly seem to provoke divided perspectives and perceptions with regards to democracy. Optimists argue that terrorism and insurgency have no relations with dissatisfaction with governance and that, insurgency is in fact one of the factors that contribute to democratic backsliding. The argument here is that extremist groups target governments with intention of causing instability to nations, which in turn creates opportunities for personal gain through illicit dealings.
Pessimists counter this line of argument by making clear that terrorism is inspired by dissatisfaction and disenchantment with sitting governments and that it is indeed the tendency of Africa’s political landscape to polarise political representation and thus marginalise those groups in society, which are not well represented in governance structures. Research surveys have concluded that it is within the youth, in African nations stricken by civil war and instability that the likelihood of joining extremist groups occurs. In most cases, the reasoning behind this phenomenon is forged in failing economies and lack of government support, as well as harassment, intimidations, kidnappings, and killings of family and friends by the government that inspires youth to join extremist groups.
Islamic fundamentalism inspired terrorism and counter-terrorism operations in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin regions, in Northern Africa and Maghreb regions, in the Horn of Africa and lately in Mozambique in Southern Africa have exacted horrific abuses on populations and rendered countries such as Somalia and Mali failed states. Government security forces and non-state armed groups have been implicated in massacres, targeted killings, sexual violence, burning and looting of villages, kidnappings, forced recruitment — including children — attacks on students and teachers, and illegal occupation of schools. The near-total impunity of abuses worsens an already fragile humanitarian and human rights situation on the continent. The 2021 Fragile States Index compiled by The Fund for Peace shows that 15 out of 20 failed states in the world are African – from Somalia in the Horn of Africa to Mali in the Sahel and including Africa’s most populous nation, Nigeria.
Conclusion
From the foregoing discussion and analysis, it is evident that the democratic gains made in the first decade of the 21st century, have largely been eviscerated by a resurgence on authoritarianism in recent times. If the optimism that greeted the wave of democratization was based on the possibility of institutional development, the personalization of power by leaders well into the current times offers a cautionary tale. Indeed, it is a case of old habits dying hard as the old politics of African strongmen proves difficult to shake off. Most political systems in Africa remain characterised by dominant and often unaccountable executive power possessed by the so-called African big men. The predictable consequence is the undemocratic practices that trigger electoral fraud, military takeovers, popular uprisings, terrorism and other forms of explicit and implicit protests.
In line with these trends, more and more African countries are moving not towards democratic dispensations but illiberal authoritarianism. Having offered opening thoughts on democracy in Africa, follow up works will endeavour to dig deeper into specific themes and case studies with a view to contributing towards democratization in Africa.
Endnotes
[i] Matlosa, K. (2018) “The Nature and Future of Democracy in Africa: The Essence of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance,” African Journal of Democracy and Governance, 5 (3).
[ii]Levitsky, S. & Lucan, W. (2002) “Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy, 13.
[iii] See M. Anna Pitcher, Political Parties and Political Economy in Africa’s Democracies, 1990-2018 in Nic Cheeseman (Ed.) The Oxford Encyclopedia of African Politics, 2020, Oxford University Press
[iv] Ake, C. (1991) “Rethinking African Democracy”, Journal of Democracy, 2.
[v] [v] See Statista (2020) “Sub-Saharan Africa: corruption perception index score as of 2020, by Country”. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1211798/corruption-perception-index-in-sub-saharan-africa/
[vi] See RSF (2020) “Reporters Without Borders 2020 world press freedom index”. https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2020
[vii] Obi. C (2008) “No Choice But Democracy? Prising the People Out of Politics In Africa,” in Claude Ake Memorial Papers, No.2
[viii] See African Union (2019) “African charter on democracy, elections and governance”, Status list. https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-democracy-elections-and-governance
[ix] See African Union (2008) “African charter on democracy, elections and governance”, Treaty. https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-democracy-elections-and-governance
[x] Ndebele, L (2021) “Democracy under threat in Africa – think tank worried authoritarianism is growing ‘more brazen”, News24. Commentary article.
[xi] Cheesman, N. (2019) “Both Authoritarianism and Democracy are on the Rise in Africa,” The Conversation Africa, 18 February.
[xii] Aljazeera (2020) “Gambia crisis ends as Yahya Jammeh leaves for exile”, news. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/1/22/gambia-crisis-ends-as-yahya-jammeh-leaves-for-exile
[xiii] Temin, J (2020) “Democratic trends in Africa in four charts”, Freedom house, perspectives. https://freedomhouse.org/article/democratic-trends-africa-four-charts[xiv] De Waal, N. & Black, J. (2019) “The Puzzle of Electoral Continuity” in Electoral Politics in Africa Since 1990: Continuity in Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[xv] In on Africa. (2014) “Corruption in Africa: Implications for development”, Polity. Opinion.
[xvi] Hanson, S (2009) “Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Council on Foreign Relations.
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